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ABSTRACT: Since 1970 income inequality has been stable or rising in almost every country 
in the world.  It has not, however, risen at the same time or at the same rate throughout the 
world.  This suggests the globalization, skills premium, and technological change 
explanations that prevail in the economics literature are likely incorrect, since all of these 
processes should in principle have relatively uniform global impacts.  Instead, the timing and 
geo-cultural patterns of rising inequality bear the hallmarks of a diffusion model.  Inequality 
has not arisen simultaneously around the world; it has "spread" from country to country in 
recognizable and sensible patterns.  The diffusion model offers a simple, intuitively-appealing
alternative to extraordinarily complex regression models of rising inequality.  Diffusion can 
occur either through emulation (a macrophenomenological mechanism) or through coercion 
(a macrorealist mechanism).  These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.  Either or 
both can be used by national elites to effect major changes of policy regime.  Diffusion by 
emulation and diffusion by coercion are two macro-level mechanisms that can be used as a 
template for understanding the implementation of inequality-increasing social and economic 
policies in diverse countries around the world.  They can be differentiated through 
examination of the micro-level mechanisms through which diffusion occurred in specific 
historical cases.  This injection of agency into the inequality debates requires extensive micro-
level work on individual countries, but the clear existence of macro-level trends suggests that 
this micro-level work should be done within the context of some form of macro-level 
diffusion model. 
Introduction
Since 1970 income inequality has been stable or rising in essentially every country in the 
world.  The only substantial exceptions have been countries that have used extraordinary 
natural resource wealth to reduce inequality, either through explicitly antisystemic economic 
policies (Venezuela) or through explicitly redistributive fiscal policies (Norway).  Throughout
the rest of the world -- and indeed even in Norway where wage income is concerned -- 
inequality is on the rise.  It has not, however, risen at the same time or at the same rate 
throughout the world.  This suggests the globalization, skills premium, and technological 
change explanations that prevail in the economics literature are likely incorrect, since all of 
these processes should in principle have relatively uniform global impacts.  Instead, the 
timing and geo-cultural patterns of rising inequality bear the hallmarks of a diffusion model.  
Inequality has not arisen simultaneously around the world; it has "spread" from country to 
country in a recognizable and sensible pattern.
Conventional explanations of rising inequality have used regression models to regress 
inequality levels or trends on postulated causes of rising inequality.  These models have led to
tenuous, non-robust, and often contradictory results (Babones and Vonada 2009).  It is 
possible that the results reported in the inequality literature are so unstable because the 
inequality data themselves are of such low quality.  Countering this interpretation is the fact 
that inequality itself has repeatedly been linked to many kinds of negative health outcomes.  
Without taking a position on the causality of these links, from a purely methodological 
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standpoint this shows that inequality is sufficiently well-measured that robust regression 
results can be achieved using the inequality figures reported in international datasets.  The 
precariousness of the results of regressions using inequality as the dependent variable cannot 
be pinned solely on the poor measurement of inequality.
The diffusion model offers a simple, intuitively-appealing alternative to extraordinarily 
complex regression models of rising inequality.  Viewed in comparative historical 
perspective, it is clear that in the post World War II period inequality began rising first in the 
United States, rose fastest in the United States, and is now much higher in the United States 
than in any other rich country.  The United States is a globally hegemonic state that possesses 
extraordinarily wide -- perhaps unprecedented -- global cultural, economic, and political 
reach.  There is no consensus on why income inequality began rising in the United States in 
the early 1970s, but circumstantial evidence points strongly to domestic political factors.  
Starting in the early 1970s the United States experienced rising inequality in wages, a shift 
from wage income to investment income, declining tax rates on high wages, and declining tax
rates on investment income, all at the same time.  In other words, inequality and all of the 
levers of increasing inequality moved decisively in the same direction at the same time.
It was only after inequality began to rise in the United States that the trend toward rising 
inequality is observed in other countries.  This post hoc fact is well-established, but the 
diffusion model implies that rising inequality outside the United States was not just post hoc 
but also propter hoc.  There are multiple theoretical bases for understanding how inequality 
could "spread" from the United States to other countries.  In the world society framework, 
diffusion is motivated by the emulation of economic models that are perceived to be 
successful (Meyer et al 1997).  Given the absolutely hegemonic status of the United States in 
the post-war period, diffusion by emulation would not be surprising.  On the other hand, high-
inequality economic models can also be imposed by external material circumstances 
(including market and military mechanisms), as suggested by the world-systems framework 
for understanding globalization (Wallerstein 1974).  The shift from cooperation to 
competition in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of managed 
exchange rates and the near-completion of decolonization in the early 1970s together created 
ideal conditions for international coercion.
In Meyer's language, the world society approach is macrophenomenological, while the world-
systems approach is macrorealist.  In the former, ideas spread through their own power, while 
in the latter ideas spread through coercive power.  These two diffusion mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive; on the contrary, there are good reasons for believing they are 
complementary.  In particular, macrorealist mechanisms are likely to be imposed where 
macrophenomenological mechanisms fail.  In the next two sections below, I sketch the 
chronology of when inequality began rising, country by country, dividing the countries into 
cases of diffusion by emulation and diffusion by coercion.  I conclude by speculating on the 
class bases of inequality diffusion by emulation and diffusion by coercion in rich and poor 
countries.
Cases of Diffusion by Emulation
In the United States, income inequality declined for a century until 1970.  Since roughly 
1968-1973 inequality in the United States has risen dramatically.  The first countries outside 
the United States to experience rising inequality were those with the closest cultural times to 
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the US: first Canada and the UK (1970s), then Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand (1980s).  
Rising inequality did not become a major social policy issue in the non-English-speaking rich 
countries of the world until the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This suggests a clear cultural 
pattern of policy emulation, with those countries that had the easiest access to US ideas 
inundated first by the tide of rising inequality, with others holding out much longer or even 
resisting completely.
Data from the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo et al 2013) can be used to attach 
precise dates to the inflection from post-war declining inequality to post-1970 rising 
inequality.  The World Top Incomes Database contains annual observations of income 
distribution for most rich countries based on tax returns data.  I use data for the proportion of 
personal income going to the top 0.5% of tax households.  The choice of the 0.5% threshold 
was made based on data availability.  Other thresholds give similar dates, plus or minus one 
or two years.  All top incomes series move in close unison.
The proportion of all personal income going to the top 0.5% of tax households reached its 
historical minimum of 5.07% in the United States in 1973, down from more than 8% in the 
1940s.  After 1973 the proportion rose dramatically.  It reached a peak of 14.32% in 2007 and
is still hovering over 13%.  The 0.5% top income share followed a similar trajectory in the 
United Kingdom, falling from 9%-10% in the 1940s to a low of 3.6% in 1978.  Since then it 
has risen in tandem with the US rate, lagging about 5-10 years behind the US curve.  Today 
the 0.5% share in the United Kingdom is between 10% and 12%, not as high as in the United 
States but roughly equal to the US share in the early 2000s.
The top 0.5% income share inflection points for other English-speaking countries follow in 
close order their cultural closeness to the United States: US, 1971; UK, 1978; Canada, 1978; 
Australia, 1981; New Zealand, 1986; Ireland, 1987.  These dates are plotted on a world map 
in Figure 1, along with dates for other rich countries and regions.  Top incomes reached a 
minimum in Japan in 1996 and then began rising, while in northern and western European 
countries minimum inequality was reached in the 2000s.  The recentness of the inequality 
inflection in Europe makes precise dating difficult; we need another decade of data before we 
will know whether or not the minimums achieved in the 2000s have been decisively reversed. 
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that inequality is now rising across all of the rich 
countries of northern and western Europe.
All of these rich countries have the ability to set social policy somewhat independently of the 
pressures of international markets and US political and military hegemony -- should they 
choose to do so.  Seen in this context, the ordered pattern of rising inequality according to 
cultural closeness to the United States is strong evidence of macrophenomenological 
mechanisms of emulation: countries model their policies on those of the global hegemon.  
The spread of neoliberal approaches to the governance of labor and financial markets has 
clearly been aided by the spreading influence of English-language institutions like business 
newspapers and business schools.  Throughout Europe and Japan, in social spheres where 
English is the accepted language of communication, neoliberalism is the accepted language of
policy. 
Most poor countries do not have the levels of policy freedom experienced by rich countries, 
but a few very large middle-income countries do have much more practical independence than
the other non-rich countries of the world.  The "big three" non-rich powers are China, Russia, 
and India.  China represents a clear case of diffusion by emulation: in 1978 the 
internationally-traveled Deng Xiaoping announced the economic liberalization policy that has
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continued through today.  Perhaps not coincidentally, the United States recognized the PRC 
as the government of China on January 1, 1979.  In the former Soviet Union, while the 
breakup of the USSR certainly occurred under pressure from the United States, it is obvious 
that it was precipitated primarily by internal, not external, pressures.  Most of the post-
communist states eagerly adopted neoliberal economic policies immediately after 
independence, sparking extraordinarily rapid increases in inequality.
India is a less straightforward case.  India's economic liberalization starting in 1991 was 
precipitated by a balance of payments crisis that resulted in IMF intervention with a 
conditional loan agreement.  That said, the opportunity for liberalization was eagerly seized 
upon by India's newly elected government.  In other words, in India we can perhaps see a case
of emulation aided by coercion through what Harvey (2005) has called the "management and 
manipulation of crises."  India could have devalued its currency to avert a crisis, but the 
government of the day chose instead to seek IMF support -- with concomitant IMF 
conditionality.  National elites made use of macrorealist pressures to foster 
macrophenomenological change.
Figure 1. Inequality Inflection Dates for Emulation-Model Diffusion
Diffusion by Coercion
In the early 1980s, and particularly with the Mexican debt of 1982, the Latin American 
growth miracle came to an abrupt end.  The IMF applied the new doctrine of "conditionality" 
to force social and economic changes that led to rising inequality across the region.  This is a 
clear example of coercion, but as in India a case can be made that it was coercion aided and 
applauded by many local elites.  The follow-up debt crisis of 1994 resulted in further 
externally imposed (but internally abetted) economic liberalization.  Inequality, already high 
in Latin America, increased to globally unprecedented levels in the mid-1990s, though since 
the late 1990s there has been a fall-back in inequality in Brazil and other Latin American 
countries from the historic highs of the post-crisis 1990s (Gasparini and Lustig 2011).
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In 1997 when east Asia experienced its own crisis, a similar set of conditions were imposed 
by the IMF and other western powers, but this time many of the affected countries pushed 
back against inequality-inducing policies.  Only the weaker southeast Asian economies 
suffered seriously rising inequality on the Latin American model.  Malaysia refused IMF 
conditionality, while South Korea implemented neoliberal conditions so half-heartedly that it 
can be considered to have subverted the international conditions regime.  These outcomes, 
combined with the Latin American experience since the late 1990s, suggest that externally 
imposed policies that result in rising inequality are perhaps not as robust as inequality that 
diffuses through emulation.
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has led directly to the imposition of extreme 
"austerity" policies that are leading to higher income inequality across southern Europe.  The 
unpopularity (and seeming unsuccessfulness) of these policies in Greece, Portugal, and Spain 
suggest that they might be at least partially reversed by future governments.  It seems likely 
that in these cases coercion will have an impact similar to that in Latin America: permanent 
changes in economic structure tempered to some extent by a reaction against their more 
extreme effects on society.  Of course, only time will tell how these most recent cases of the 
coercive diffusion of a high-inequality economic model will pan out.
Conclusion
Diffusion models for the spread of inequality have the potential to restore some 
contextualized meaning to today's increasingly abstract statistical debates about the causes of 
rising inequality.  Regression models that postulate that rising inequality is due to the effects 
of variables like trade globalization do not stand up to the comparative historical 
scrutinization of individual cases.  There is really no doubt that region-wide phenomenon of 
rising inequality in Latin America immediately following the shocks of 1982 and 1994 was 
due to the economic changes that occurred at those times; it also seems clear that rising 
inequality in Canada spread up from south of the border and in the UK was closely connected 
to the Prime Mininstership of Margaret Thatcher.  These kinds of geographical and historical 
contingencies simply are not captured in the regression framework.
Even more difficult to capture -- because more difficult to measure -- is the impact of class 
conflict on economic inequality.  By definition, rising inequality is a shift in economic 
rewards from poor to rich, and almost by definition it represents a shift in economic power 
from power to rich.  Obviously, rich and powerful people in every country have enormous 
incentives to promote policies that result in rising inequality.  This class conflict aspect of 
rising inequality seems to be totally absent from the regression-based social scientific 
literature.  It is the elephant in the room.  To remove the agency of the rich from the study of 
rising inequality flies in the face of common sense, to say nothing of rational choice models 
of human behavior.  It is not credible to suggest (as most of the literature does) that rising 
inequality is entirely due to larger macro-historical forces without so much as a hand in the 
right direction from those who stand to benefit most from the trend.  Rich and powerful 
people would be extraordinarily irrational indeed if they did not promote rising inequality.
The injection of agency into the inequality debates requires extensive micro-level work on 
individual countries, but the clear existence of macro-level trends suggests that this micro-
level work should be done within the context of some form of macro-level diffusion model.  
Diffusion by emulation and diffusion by coercion are two macro-level mechanisms that can 
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be used as a template for understanding the implementation of inequality-increasing social 
and economic policies in diverse countries around the world.  As the Indian case illustrates, 
these two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.  Either or both can be used by national 
elites to effect major changes of policy regime.  One frontier of inequality research should be 
the study of how the macro-level diffusion of inequality is enacted through micro-level 
agency.  This is difficult, time-consuming work, but it is likely to be more productive than the
next generation of purely macro-level regression-based research.
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